【1078期】3月9日微观经济学学术研讨会:Stable and Balanced Outcome of Bilateral Bargaining in Networks (郑捷副教授,清华大学)

时间:2021-03-01

【主题】Stable and Balanced Outcome of Bilateral Bargaining in Networks

【报告人】郑捷(副教授,清华大学)

【时间】39日 星期二下午 14:30 16:00

【地点】经济学院607

【摘要】In this paper, we study the generalized Nash bargaining solution of bilateral bargaining in any given (finite) network, which is equivalent to the bilateral balanced outcome of a cooperative bargaining game defined by the network structure. Players, represented by nodes in a network, can bilaterally bargain with one of those who are directly connected with them, where such a direct connection is defined as an edge in the network. The weight of edges can be different, allowing heterogeneous surplus to be divided within different bargaining pairs. An outcome is defined as a two-tuple, containing a bilateral matching structure and a payoff vector for all players. First, we show that in any stable or balanced outcome players must be paired under a maximum-weight matching (MWM), and if a payoff vector with a MWM constitutes a stable (balanced) outcome, the same payoff vector will also constitute a stable (balanced) outcome with any MWM of the network. Thus, to solve for stable or balanced outcomes, it suffices to focus on payoff vectors under any MWM. Then, we characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions on network structure that ensure the existence of stable and balanced outcomes, and we provide the necessary and sufficient condition for the balanced payoff vector of players to be unique. Finally, we show that any balanced outcome of a general weighted network consists of hierarchical balanced bargaining structures. And we identify the asymmetric outside option dependencies among different hierarchies of the balanced outcome though an algorithm provided to find out balanced outcomes of any finite weighted network. Our work combines and contributes to the literature on Nash bargaining, cooperative games, and network games. (Coauthored with Gaoyang Cai and Junpeng Xia)

 

 


 


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