977期 3月12日:On the Optimal Design of Biased Contests(傅强,副教授,新加坡国立大学)

时间:2019-03-04

【主题】On the Optimal Design of Biased Contests

【报告人】傅强(副教授,新加坡国立大学)

【时间】3月12日(星期二) 15:30-17:00

【地点】经济学院楼702

【语言】英文

【摘要/Abstract】This  paper develops a novel technique to characterize the optimal  identity-dependent treatment in contests, which vary the balance of the  playing field in the competition. A generalized lottery contest, in  general, yields no closed-form equilibrium solutions, which nullifies  the usual implicit programming approach in optimal contest design and  limits the existing analysis in restricted settings. We propose an  alternative approach that allows us to circumvent this difficulty and  obtain the optimum in a general setting and toward a wide array of  objective functions without solving for the equilibrium explicitly. Our  approach applies to broad contexts, and the analysis enabled by the  technique generates novel implications on the strategic substance of  contest game and its optimal design. With a mild assumption on the  objective function, we show that the performance of the contest cannot  be further improved by allowing for headstart in addition to  multiplicative biases on contestants' effective effort entry. We  demonstrate that the conventional wisdom of leveling the playing field,  which is obtained in limited settings in previous studies, does not  generally hold.

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