【主题】Re-allocation of Political Connection and Taxation over Local Political Cycles
【摘要/Abstract】This study investigates formation and break of companies' political connection over local political cycles in China. I document following findings. First, Companies differ considerably in their degree of political connection. On average, capital intensive companies have more politically connected top leaders as board members or executives in total number, in ratio, and in salary compensation. Second, over the local political cycles, political connection by different indicators of capital intensive companies increase with the tenure of prefectural secretaries of the CCP. The political connection indicators reach a peak in year four. Third, there is re-allocation of political connection across industries over the local political cycles. As the tenure of the prefectural secretaries rises, the political connection of the capital intensive companies increases while that of the labour intensive ones decreases. Consequently, both the effective VAT rate and credit allocation change in favour of the capital intensive firms, while to the detriment of the labour intensive counter-parts. The findings suggest that the building of political connection is frictional and takes time, and that the capital intensive firms are more liable to hold-up by local politicians and more likely to resort to political connection for protection.
【简介】陈晓光分别获得北京大学与伦敦政经学院（LSE）博士学位。现任职于西澳大利亚大学（UWA）商学院。主要研究领域为税收、增长与发展。多篇独立作者论文发表于Journal of Public Economics, Economic Letters,《中国社会科学》、《经济研究》、《经济学（季刊）》等刊物。研究成果曾获得中国留美经济学会“邹至庄最佳论文奖”、首届“中国财政学论坛优秀论文奖”、首届“中金经济学/金融学优秀博士论文奖”等奖项。