1022期 10月9日:What is in “Moral Hazard”? Evidence from a Quasi-experiment in China(黄炜,助理教授,新加坡国立大学)

时间:2019-09-29

【主题】What is in “Moral Hazard”? Evidence from a Quasi-experiment in China
【报告人】黄炜(助理教授,新加坡国立大学)
【时间】10月9日(星期三) 10:30-12:00
【地点】经济学院楼701室
【语言】英文
【摘要】Healthcare demand elasticity with respect to price is traditionally interpreted as moral hazard in health economics. Starting from 2011, one city in China significantly lowered the cost sharing of the elderly aged 80 and above. Using the administrative insurance registrar and claim data with more than 2 million individual month observations, we employ a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to identify the effects of lower cost sharing. We started by estimating the elasticity of healthcare usage with respect to price, which is -0.31. We move on to decompose this and find that about the elasticity is largely driven by intensive margin (i.e. the length of stay or the hospitalization expenses) rather than extensive margin (i.e. going to hospital). More importantly, we also find that people with lower income have a three times larger elasticity that those with higher income, suggesting large income effect of lower cost sharing policy. Finally, we explore the local pension policy and present direct evidence for the income effects on hospitalization. These findings provide some new insights about moral hazard in the previous studies.
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