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811期 7月12日 :Information asymmetries and efficiency in a frictional market(Benoit Julien , University of New South Wales)

【主讲】Benoit Julien (University of New South Wales)

【主题】Information asymmetries and efficiency in a frictional market

【时间】2017年7月12日 (周三) 14:00-15:30

【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼701室

【语言】英文

【摘要】Principals seek to form bilateral relationships with agents in a frictional environment by posting incentive contracts. A contract solves the the ex ante search problem, and adverse selection and moral hazard ex post. In doing so it introduces a trade off between incentives and participation; the strength of incentives is parametrized by market tightness. The optimal contract also features outcome-contingent distortions to solve the adverse selection problem and includes compensatory transfers to agents who fail to contract. In this frictional market the equilibrium allocation is always constrained welfare optimal, in contrast to the one-to-one principal-agent problem, which search frictions thus correct. There is also perfect risk sharing of the matching risk thanks to the compensatory transfers. These transfers are sufficient, and sometimes necessary, for welfare optimality.

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