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812期 8月4日 :Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets(Nicola Pavanini, Tilburg University)

【主讲】Nicola Pavanini (Tilburg University)

【主题】Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets

【时间】2017年8月4日 (周五) 15:30-17:00

【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼701室

【语言】英文

【摘要】We study the effects of asymmetric information and imperfect competition in the market for small business lines of credit. We estimate a structural model of credit demand, loan use, pricing, and firm default using matched firm-bank data from Italy. We find evidence of adverse selection in the form of a positive correlation between the unobserved determinants of demand for credit and default. Our counterfactual experiments show that while increases in adverse selection on average increase prices and defaults, reducing credit supply, banks’ market power can mitigate these negative effects.

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