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844期 12月12日 :A New Solution to Nash's Bargaining Problem (with Jaimie Lien)(郑捷, 清华大学助理教授)

【主讲】郑捷 (清华大学助理教授)

【主题】A New Solution to Nash's Bargaining Problem (with Jaimie Lien)

【时间】2017年12月12日 (周二) 15:30-17:00

【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼401室

【语言】英文

【摘要】Under the standard cooperative bargaining setup, it has often been argued that either the Monotonicity Axiom in Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) solution, or the Independence-of-Irrelevant-Alternatives (IIA) Axiom in Nash (1950) solution, or both, may not be well-accepted by players in various realistic scenarios. We propose a weaker version of the Monotonicity Axiom (WM) and a weaker version of the IIA Axiom (WIIA) in this paper, and show that both the Nash solution and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions satisfy both WM and WIIA. In addition, we propose a new fairness criterion which establishes a balance between players, by taking into account the number and attractiveness of their possible outcomes which are better than their outcome under the bargaining solution. Given players’ preferences over the number and attractiveness of better outcomes, a solution satisfying Pareto-Optimality, Symmetry, WM, WIIA, and the new fairness criterion is shown to uniquely exist, and under certain preferences the Scale-Invariance Axiom can also be satisfied. Such a solution is intuitive and can be implemented easily in practice.

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