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851期 12月29日 :Optimal Sequential Search Auctions with a Deadline(Daniel Zhiyun Li 助理教授, Durham University Business School )

【主讲】Daniel Zhiyun Li 助理教授 (Durham University Business School )

【主题】Optimal Sequential Search Auctions with a Deadline

【时间】2017年12月29日 (周五) 16:10-17:40

【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼701室

【语言】英文

【摘要】A seller wants to allocate an indivisible good among a number of potential bidders by a deadline, and to contact a bidder, she needs to pay a positive search cost. The problem is quite general in many practical situations, such as in merger and acquisitions, matching in marriage markets, sequential contests, and so on.
We investigate the optimal mechanism for this problem, and show that its outcomes can be implemented by a sequence of second-price auctions. The optimal sequential auction is characterized by declining reserve prices and increasing search intensity over time, and these results are robust in both cases of short-lived and long-lived bidders. When bidders are long-lived, the optimal reserve prices demonstrate a one-step-ahead property, and our model incorporates the one-by-one sequential search problem as a special case. We further examine an efficient search mechanism, and show that the efficient mechanism is featured by lower reserve prices and higher search intensity than the optimal mechanism.

【讲员简介】李志赟 (PhD, Oxford 2012),英国Durham大学商学院助理教授,其目前研究领域为information in auctions, auctions with participation costs and consumer search等。其成果曾发表于Journal of Comparative Economics, Economic Letters等期刊。

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