857期 1月25日 :Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences(Ritesh Jain, 俄亥俄州立大学 博士)
上海财经大学经济学院
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857期 1月25日 :Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences(Ritesh Jain, 俄亥俄州立大学 博士)

【主讲】Ritesh Jain (俄亥俄州立大学 博士)

【主题】Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences

【时间】2018年1月25日 (周四) 15:30-17:00

【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼701室

【语言】英文

【摘要】 I study which social choice rules can be implemented by a mechanism when rationalizability is considered as the appropriate prediction of behavior in games. Introduced by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984), rationalizability is a central solution concept in game theory and makes weaker predictions than Nash equilibrium. The main result of my paper asserts that in a society with more than three agents, a social choice rule can be implemented in rationalizable strategies if it satisfies three properties: r-monotonicity, no worst alternative condition, and Theta_F-distinguishability. Out of these, r-monotonicity is shown to be necessary. As an application of the main result, I show that Pareto correspondence can be implemented in rationalizable strategies. On the other hand, in general, no Condorcet extension can be implemented in rationalizable strategies.

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上海财经大学经济学院