895期 5月16日 :The Role of Information Structures in a Binary Threshold Game (joint work with Bo Chen)(Raj Deb, 教授, Southern Methodist University)
上海财经大学经济学院
科学研究
当前位置:首页 >> 科学研究 >> 学术讲座
895期 5月16日 :The Role of Information Structures in a Binary Threshold Game (joint work with Bo Chen)(Raj Deb, 教授, Southern Methodist University)

【主讲】Raj Deb (教授, Southern Methodist University)

【主题】The Role of Information Structures in a Binary Threshold Game (joint work with Bo Chen)

【时间】2018年5月16日 (周三) 15:30-17:00

【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼701室

【语言】英文

【摘要】We analyze a binary sequential game with a tipping point in the presence of imperfect information. An information structure summarizes what each agent can observe before making her decision. Focusing on information structures where only "aggregate information" from past history can be observed, we characterize information structures that can lead to various (efficient and inefficient) Nash equilibria. When individual decision making can be rationalized using a process of iterative dominance (Moulin (1979)), we derive a necessary and sufficient condition on information structures under which a unique and efficient equilibrium outcome is obtained. Our results suggest that if sufficient (and not necessarily perfect) information is available, coordination failure can be overcome without centralized intervention.

上一条 | 下一条
上海财经大学经济学院