上海财经大学经济学院
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956期 12月10日 :A Model of Tournament Incentives with Corruption (with Bin Wang)(郑瑜, 讲师,伦敦大学玛丽皇后学院)

【主讲】郑瑜 (讲师,伦敦大学玛丽皇后学院)

【主题】A Model of Tournament Incentives with Corruption (with Bin Wang)

【时间】2018年12月10日 (周一) 15:30-17:00

【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼702室

【语言】英文

【摘要】We provide a theory of how growth, corruption, and a low-powered public-sector pay scale coexist in a stable equilibrium in the early stage of China's development. The regionally decentralized authoritarian regime of China features lower-level government officials competing for promotion to a higher level in the government by generating local economic growth, and calls for high-powered incentives to elicit effort from the the officials. However, this is at odds with the generally low-powered public-sector pay scale in China. We propose a principal-agent model, where the principal represents the Chinese people's desire to pursue economic growth and the agents are the government officials delegated with production tasks and organized in a tournament, to address how a low-powered pay scale can effectively elicit effort in a tournament infested with widespread corruption.

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